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Abstract 
 
 
A judgement is an assertion made with evidence or good reason in a 
context of uncertainty.  In psychiatry the uncertainty is inherent in the 
professional context, and the evidence derives from the academic 
literature and scientific studies as they are applied to a specific patient. 
The nature of the uncertainty and the factors which should inform 
professional judgement are explored.  Professional judgement is currently 
facing two serious challenges: an obsession with numbers, which comes 
from within medicine, and the ‘patient choice’ agenda, which is 
politically inspired and comes from outside medicine.  This paper strives 
to defend professional judgement in the clinic against both challenges.  
 
 
The nature of judgement 
 
A judgement is an assertion made with some evidence or for a good 
reason, in a context of uncertainty (Reid 1785). There can of course be 
bad judgements when the evidence is defective. For simplicity we shall 
use the term ‘judgement’ to refer to good judgement. There are two basic 
types of (good) judgement:  theoretical and practical.  A theoretical 
judgement is an assertion about what is probably true or correct, and a 
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practical judgment concerns what we ought to do.  In both cases there 
must be some evidence or some reasonable considerations determining 
our judgement; otherwise it is not a judgement but a guess.  And in both 
cases the context must be one of uncertainty.  We do not judge that 2+2 
=4 because we know it with certainty. Theoretical and practical 
judgements are of course often linked in that our judgement of what we 
have good evidence for believing can be grounds for our judgement of 
what we ought to do. 
 
A professional judgement is a judgement made in a professional context. 
It can be either theoretical or practical.  More explicitly, the uncertainty 
derives from the professional context, and the evidence or relevant 
considerations are acquired by means of professional knowledge and 
skills. We shall first explore the professional context which gives rise to 
the uncertainty, and then suggest the factors which should inform 
professional judgement. It will emerge from this analysis why 
professional judgement is worth defending against some current threats to 
it.  
 
Factors which create uncertainty in the professional context 
 
Firstly, there can be uncertainty concerning the diagnosis.  This is 
notoriously the case with mental illness.  Secondly, even when the 
diagnosis is reasonably clear there can be uncertainty about how long the 
illness will last and whether it will give rise to any connected 
complications. Thirdly, there can be uncertainty about the treatment. The 
evidence suggests that it will lead to an improvement in 65% of cases, but 
will it be of benefit for this patient?  Fourthly, the patient may be 
uncertain. Patients are by the very nature of their situation in a weak 
position, and the patients of a psychiatrist are among the most vulnerable 
of all. They may be confused, hostile to the psychiatrist, and resistant to 
all treatment, or reserved and uncommunicative. Uncertainty about how 
to proceed is inevitable.  These four types of uncertainty (there may be 
others) can be summed up by saying that in all medical situations there is 
likely to be a varying degree of uncertainty about what is in the patient’s 
best interests, and that this uncertainty is at its maximum in psychiatric 
cases.  The first condition for professional judgement - uncertainty -is 
therefore  manifestly present in psychiatric cases.  
 
 
Factors which should determine professional judgement in 
psychiatry 
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Theoretical factors.  The first theoretical factor is obviously the long 
training in medical school and thereafter the specialised training required 
by the Royal Colleges and other institutional bodies concerned with the 
making of the competent consultant. But despite the emphasis on the 
academic side of medical training it remains importantly a kind of 
apprenticeship based on the model of ‘see one, do one, teach one’. 
Bedside teaching remains of the first importance for informing the 
judgement of the trainee psychiatrist.  This may be especially true for the 
art of diagnosis.   
 
 Secondly, the judgement of the psychiatrist should be informed by the 
evidence which derives from trials.  ‘Evidence-based medicine’ (EBM) 
has for many years been a widely accepted slogan and all branches of 
medicine insist on continuing medical education (CME) where the latest 
evidence-based treatments are discussed.  There can be no doubt that 
technical knowledge deriving from EBM must be dominant among the 
factors which determine theoretical judgements in psychiatry. 
 
Practical factors. Practical judgements will have EBM as a central 
component. But EBM is by no means the only relevant factor which 
should determine practical judgement. Doctors must also know when, 
how, and how much to exercise their skills.  For example, what is the 
balance of benefits to harms and risks?  Does the patient really 
understand these? Has the patient consented to the risks?  What are the 
long-term prospects of recovery?    This kind of judgement is of a 
different order from diagnostic and treatment judgements; it certainly 
involves technical judgements, but it also involves judgements of 
(broadly speaking) moral value. Judgements of this kind are unique to 
medicine and in order to understand their importance we need to consider 
the special relationship which the psychiatrist has with a patient.  It is in 
this special relationship that we shall find the third and fourth factors 
which should inform the professional judgement in psychiatry. 
 
 
Relationships: bonds.  The word ‘relationship’ can be used in two ways 
(Downie and Macnaughton 2000; pp 78-89).  It can refer to the bonds 
which hold two people together, or it can refer to their attitudes to each 
other.  For example, if we see two people together, we might ask what is 
the relationship between them, and receive answers such as: father and 
son, colleagues, husband and wife, teacher and pupil, doctor and patient, 
and so on.  To characterise a relationship in this way is to ask about what 
we are calling the ‘bonds.’  But we might ask what kind of relationship 
do Bloggs and his son have, and be told ‘Bloggs has great affection for 
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his son, but his son has nothing but contempt for his father.’  Or we might 
say of a husband and wife that their relationship is deteriorating, or of that 
between a doctor and a patient that the patient trusts the doctor and the 
doctor respects the patient.  Answers of that kind characterise a 
relationship in terms of attitudes.  A professional relationship requires 
both bond and attitude. 
 
The bonds in a professional relationship are decided by the governing 
body, for example, by the General Medical Council.  It is necessary that 
there should be special bonds between professional and patient because of 
the inequality in the relationship.  In brief, the client or patient is 
vulnerable and needs the protection of the bond.  In general, we might say 
that the bond takes the form of a role-relationship in which both 
professional and client have rights and duties laid down by the governing 
body.  For example, a doctor might need to know various intimate details 
about the patient in order to be able to offer the service.  The client must 
be reassured that no untoward use will be made of this information.  
Hence, the duties of confidentiality are imposed on the professional.  
Doctors are told that ‘the patient is a person,’ and so on.  Yes, but they 
are persons in a role relationship when they are dealing with a 
professional.  And the nature of the role is laid down by the professional 
body, and obviously reflects the values of the profession.  In other words, 
ethics enters a profession via the professional bond. 
 
The third factor which should inform professional judgement in 
psychiatry is therefore knowledge of the legal and ethical regulations 
which exist in legislation and in the guidance of the Royal Colleges, the 
BMA and the GMC.  The obtaining of informed consent for treatment is 
especially problematic in psychiatry where questions of the patient’s 
competence to consent may be doubtful, and in England the recent 
Mental Capacity Act has altered the situation.  Hence, knowledge of 
current regulations is an important determinant of professional 
judgement. 
 
 
Relationships: attitudes. The professional attitude must reflect 
awareness of the vulnerability of the client or patient.  Often the 
professional attitude is described by a phrase such as  ‘concern for best 
interests’. It is the doctor’s duty to supply information to the patient and 
the patient’s right to give or withhold consent to the proposed treatment 
in the light of that information. Whatever the details of the appropriate 
attitudes involved in the professional relationship – and we shall have 
more to say on this -  an attitudinal component is the fourth factor which 
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should inform professional judgement.  Indeed, in psychiatry the attitude 
of the psychiatrist to the patient may be integral to the healing process. 
 
Developing professional judgement 
 
 How can the four factors we have mentioned as necessary for informing 
judgement in psychiatry be developed.  There is little difficulty about the 
factors 1-2.  As was said, diagnostic skills can be acquired in various 
ways but apprenticeship may be the most important way.  Information on 
appropriate treatments can be obtained from the copious literature and 
data bases.  Ethics also can be presented in a learnable and teachable way. 
Sometimes it is said that ethics is entirely a matter of opinion.  As far as 
medicine goes this view is false.  The GMC, BMA, the Royal Colleges 
and similar institutions in other countries issue guidelines on ethical 
issues and these represent current ethical thinking.  Doctors can and ought 
to be familiar with these quasi legal documents if they are to make 
informed and acceptable treatment judgements. 
 
 It is much harder to develop what we have called the attitudinal factor in 
judgement.  We might suggest that whereas factors 1-3 of the 
determinants of good judgement require expert training, the attitudinal 
component requires a broad education. What are the differences between 
being trained to have skills, and being educated in humane values?  This, 
of course, is a large topic in its own right but a few points can helpfully 
be made here (Downie and Macnaughton 2007; pp. 117-120).   
 
Firstly, the person educated in humane values has a broad cognitive 
perspective and is able to see the significance of medicine in a total way 
of life.  Secondly, the person of humane education has continual curiosity 
about the world, a desire to develop knowledge and skills throughout a 
working life, and connectedly is aware of the standards of work which 
must be satisfied.  Here we have the familiar idea of a ‘professional job,’ 
or ‘a job well done.’  Thirdly, the idea of a humane education embodies 
the idea of ethics.  It is possible to be trained to pick pockets, as in 
Dickens’ Oliver Twist, but a humane education is necessarily directed to 
worthwhile ends.  Here we have the idea of standards of behaviour, of 
‘being professional’ in one’s approach to a client or patient.  Fourthly, the 
broadly educated person has a flexibility of mind which enables her/him 
to see things in a variety of ways.  To paraphrase the words of the 
educational philosopher RS Peters (1967) to be trained is to have arrived, 
but to be educated is to travel with a different view. Good judgement 
requires the constant review of false finalities. 
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 We shall not take up the question of how far undergraduate medical 
schools or postgraduate CME stress or concern themselves at all with the 
matter of broad education in humane values.  Professionalism has for 
some time in the USA been linked to the growing field of ‘medical 
humanities’ and this link is now becoming apparent in the UK (Meakin, 
2007). This connection offers the opportunity to broaden medical training 
into medical education and thereby develop the insights of  professional 
judgement. 
 
On the other hand, there are various contemporary challenges to 
professional judgement. We shall discuss two:  that the need for 
professional judgement is minimised by stressing the alleged ‘objectivity’ 
of quantitative data; or by prioritising patient choice over professional 
judgement.  
 
The distorting effect of numbers: implications for professional 
judgement 
 
Research in psychiatry is of various kinds, but we shall confine our 
discussion to qualitative research (Jones 1995). Qualitative research is 
concerned with such matters as what a disease or a treatment ‘means’ to a 
patient, or with ‘patient-centredness’ or ‘doctor satisfaction’. Issues of 
this kind are important since they provide knowledge on which clinical  
judgement can be based.  But if knowledge or evidence is to be useful for 
informing clinical judgement as it applies to a variety of individual cases 
it must in some way be generalisable.  How can what is essentially 
qualitative be generalised? 
 
In quantitative research generalized knowledge is acquired via inductive 
procedures.  For example a cohort of patients with a given disorder and 
other similarities may be selected for a new treatment, and others for a 
placebo or an existing treatment.  The new treatment may be shown to 
have some success with 70% of patients in the cohort.  This generalized 
evidence is then available to inform the clinician’s judgement in an 
individual case.  The use of numbers and the procedures of randomization 
suggest that the evidence is ‘objective’, and can therefore be relied on as 
a basis for judgement in an individual case. 
 
In view of the need to generalise and so acquire objectivity there has been 
a tendency to force qualitative research into a similar quantitative mould.  
For example, we find qualities like ‘patient-centredness’ being given a 
score of 1.45 and doctor satisfaction measured as 8.95 (Law and Britten 
1995). We have discussed in detail elsewhere the wider issue of whether 
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qualitative research can meaningfully use measurements and scales in the 
manner of quantitative research and will not repeat the arguments here 
(Downie and Macnaughton 2000; pp. 26-38). We shall argue here that the 
attempt to generalize and achieve ‘objectivity’ via numbers actually 
distorts the way doctors view their patients and therefore distorts their 
clinical judgements.  Finally we shall suggest another way of interpreting 
qualitative research which has a different kind of connection with 
judgement. 
 
  
The single most important factor which leads to the distortion of 
qualitative research and therefore the judgements based on it we can call 
‘reductionism’.   The term ‘reductionism’ is used in a variety of ways 
(Honderich ( ed.) 2005) but we mean here the process of seeing human 
beings and their interactions in terms of a number of discrete features.  
Reductionism is essential for countability because  there must be an 
answer to the question: what are you counting?  In qualitative research 
those features are (for example) eye contacts, or answers to questions in 
the form of ticks in a box.  But to try to understand patients in this way, in 
terms of a finite number of discrete features, is to abstract from the 
complexity and totality of a human interaction.  Blood pressure can 
helpfully be abstracted in this way and measured, but not a human 
response in its complex totality.  There is something not only patronising 
but clinically misleading in the suggestion that the complexity of human 
relationships can be reduced to a few factors and ‘measured’ with an 
‘assessment tool’. 
 
The desire to use numbers (because they are thought to be ‘objective’) 
has a distorting effect in two ways.  Firstly, the use of numbers suggests 
that the knowledge obtained by the qualitative research is a kind of 
induction-based knowledge when (as we shall see) it is quite different in 
nature and has a different sort of bearing on individual judgement.  
Secondly, the application of that knowledge to particular cases has 
replaced what should be individualised judgement with the mass use of 
questionnaires, or ‘assessment tools’.  Medical training rightly stresses 
the importance of listening skills.  On the other hand, the reality is that 
rather than listen to what the patient may be saying the doctor or nurse 
presents the patient with a form to fill up and boxes to tick (Randall and 
Downie 2006).  This is done on the grounds that such a procedure utilises 
countable results which are therefore more ‘objective’ than simply having 
a discussion with the patient.  It certainly attempts to minimise clinical 
judgement. 
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It should also be noted that if the underlying purpose of questionnaires 
and measurement scales is to avoid the need for judgement then it does 
not succeed.  Judgement is required in deciding what questions to ask, 
what numbers to assign to them and how to interpret the final scores. 
Judgements can  be dangerous when the professionals are unaware they 
are making them and believe themselves to be ‘objective’. 
 
Generalizability and qualitative research:  a different route to 
judgement 
 
If the knowledge obtained by qualitative research is to be useful in 
informing professional judgement how should it be viewed? The answer 
is that the lessons of qualitative research for clinicians are derived from 
considering the plausibility of the particular situation in terms of their 
own experience, and on finding parallels which are helpful.  The question 
for the reader of qualitative research is: ‘Are there any general features in 
this situation that I recognize and can apply?’  The understanding 
involved in qualitative research is more akin to the understanding gained 
from literature and art than that gained from a numerical science.  This 
does not mean that it is an inferior kind of understanding, but it does 
mean that it is different in that it is reached by a different route and 
informs judgement in a different way.  It requires the active participation 
of the reader to identify with the situation and relate the findings to 
his/her own situation. In reaching this understanding the life experience 
and maturity of the clinician are all-important.  
 
Consider the following example. 
 
Sartre (1943) describes a man bending 
down to listen at a keyhole.  He believes his wife is in the room with her 
lover.  Suddenly he hears a step behind him, and immediately his attitude 
changes.  To begin with, he wanted to hear a conversation, but now he 
has become an object to someone else – an eavesdropper to be described 
and despised.  This example shows how moral emotions, such as shame, 
are experienced in a social context.  The eavesdropper minds being 
caught because he must now think of himself as mean and sneaky.  He 
despises such characteristics in others and now he must despise himself.   
 
We have used this example because it is similar to many in qualitative 
medical research.  The route to understanding is through our 
identification with the situation.  Through that identification we reach 
general features of human emotions.  There is an element of 
generalisation, but not by induction.  The imposition of quantitative 
language would obstruct this understanding by distorting the findings of 
qualitative research and making them obscure to the reader.  Even if the 
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approach of such research is narrative and descriptive of particular 
situations, for the mature clinician it can still provide understanding of 
general features of clinical situations which can inform judgement in 
individual cases. 
 
 Qualitative researchers take pride in the fact that their approach provides 
new insight into clinical situations.  They should not hide these insights 
under a numerical bushel but illuminate it with language that reflects the 
new kind of understanding they wish to convey.  To attempt to put 
numbers to the research is to distort both it and the relationship between 
doctor and patient which it is attempting to illuminate.  Qualitative 
research is best interpreted on the analogy of the humanities.  Through 
identification with the particular situation the researcher or clinician can 
recognise the general elements in human emotion.  This is unlike the 
generalisability of inductive science.  It requires a moral maturity from 
the doctor, and it can lead to a humane understanding of the patient which 
will produce a humane judgement. 
 
It might be objected that our arguments assume a universality in human 
emotions which may not exist, especially in psychiatric cases.  But even 
if there is no universality in human emotions and reactions there is a 
broad similarity, and that may be all that is needed as a basis for 
individualised judgement.  After all, even in genuine quantitative  
research a success rate of 70% might be thought significant. 
 
 
Patient choice 
 
 ‘Patient choice’ is a Trojan Horse in the sense that it suggests the 
desirable involvement of the patient in treatment decisions. And of course  
‘patient choice’ emphasises the right of the patient to refuse treatments, 
for whatever reason (BMA 1998).  The problem is however that ‘patient 
choice’ has now come to mean consumer choice, something very 
different from the choice or refusal of treatments offered by the doctor 
(Bate and Robert 2005). Consumers’ judgements and choices of the 
products they want trump those of the sales assistant. If patients are 
consumers should their judgements and choices trump those of the 
professional? 
 
What are the conditions of consumer choice? We have discussed the 
general conditions for consumerism and its threat to the NHS elsewhere 
and will not repeat the arguments here (Downie and Randall 2008). The 
threat specifically to professional judgement comes from two conditions 
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of the free market: that the consumer can determine the options available 
for choice, and that the consumer must take responsibility for what is 
chosen. For example, if the shop does not have the goods desired then the 
consumer is able to turn to the riches of the internet, and bears 
responsibility for goods so chosen. Let is examine the impact of these 
conditions on professional judgement.  
 
 
Firstly, in the traditional model the doctor offers only those options 
judged to provide net benefit and the patient consents to or refuses what 
the doctor offers.  In contrast, in the consumer model the patient is 
requiring the doctor to provide what the patient judges to be effective and 
the patient is then not consenting to the treatment but authorising the 
doctor to carry it out.  The doctor has become merely the agent of the 
patient.  It might be argued that the doctor could conscientiously object to 
carrying out a treatment the patient requested when the doctor judged that 
it was inappropriate.  But note the extraordinary paradox: in this situation 
the doctor has become the one who consents or refuses and the patient the 
one who makes the judgement!  In short, professional judgement is 
bypassed. 
 
 
The second condition of consumer choice concerns the locus of 
responsibility. In the consumer choice model the consumer takes full 
responsibility for the choice.  In contrast, in the traditional model of 
choice and consent, the doctor took responsibility for judging which 
options should be offered to the patient, whilst the patient took 
responsibility for consenting to or refusing what was offered.  The 
traditional model of choice could justifiably be described as joint 
responsibility, since each party has responsibility for different aspects of 
the decision.  By contrast, if consumer choice were accepted in the NHS 
then, logically, the responsibility must pass entirely to the patient, and the 
need for professional judgement would be much diminished.  
 
 
 
Professional judgement and consumerism:  some implications 
 
 
. What would a true consumerist health care system be like?  It would 
have at least two implications of major importance for the whole concept 
of medicine as a profession, and therefore for professional judgement.   
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Firstly, the concept of a profession would alter.  A doctor or nurse would 
become simply a purveyor of goods and services, like a plumber or a 
garage mechanic, or a shop assistant.  A doctor would not be required to 
have the values of the profession, or to exercise professional judgement. 
For example, the Royal College of Physicians’ document on 
professionalism expects doctors to have the qualities of compassion, 
integrity, altruism, etc. (RCP 2005). But these qualities do not feature in 
the consumer choice model and indeed they are out of place in that 
model. Consumerism has its own ethics and responsibilities, but they are 
quite different from those of professionalism. 
 
Secondly, consumer choice in the NHS would lead to a change in 
motivation amongst the professionals. In the consumer choice model the 
provider of the service is motivated less by a desire to improve the overall 
welfare of the consumer than to provide goods and services which will 
satisfy the consumer’s requirements at the lowest possible cost to the 
provider, thus achieving a financially acceptable profit margin. Indeed, 
the situation is worse than that. Trust is the foundation of the doctor-
patient relationship and patients still believe that their psychiatrist is 
uniquely concerned with their health. There is a reasonable fear that 
consumerism in the NHS will weaken the unique trust that patients must 
be able to place in their doctors, destroy the idea of professional 
judgement, and indeed destroy the whole idea of medicine as a 
profession. 
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                            Multiple Choice Questions 
 
A Judgement 
 
A. May be theoretical or practical  -T 
B. is made in conditions of certainty  - F 
C. is unnecessary in a professional context –F 
D. is undermined by the evidence base -  F 
E. is no longer of importance as a result of the patient choice agenda  
-  F 
 
Relationships in psychiatry 
 
A. Consist entirely of formal bonds - F 
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B. consist entirely of emotional attitudes – F 
C. are determined entirely by the patient – F 
D. are independent of ethics – F 
E. influence professional judgement - T 
 
Attitudes 
 
A. Are determined solely by professional regulation -F 
B. do not affect professional judgement -F 
C. are solely a matter for professional training –F 
D. require an ethical component –T 
E. are irrelevant to the healing process – F 
 
Qualitative Research 
 
A. requires ‘reductionism’ –F 
B. requires the use of numbers – F 
C. is made ‘objective’ by the use of numbers – F 
D. cannot be generalised – F 
E. can develop professional judgement –T 
 
Patient Choice 
 
A. has no place in the NHS -F 
B. has now replaced professional judgement –F 
C. involves joint decision making –T 
D. transfers treatment responsibility to the patient –F 
E. does not affect professional motivation -F 
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